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ABSTRACT 
Emotional Expressivity and Working Memory Capacity 
Kathryn Tweedy, M.S. 
Jacqueline D. Kloss, Ph.D. 
 
 There is a vast literature documenting the effects of emotion expression on 
physical, psychological and cognitive health.  Among these studies is preliminary 
evidence suggesting that persons who express emotion enjoy gains in neurocognitive 
functioning, while persons who suppress emotion perform poorly on cognitive tasks.  
However, the link between the trait of emotional expressivity and cognitive function 
remains largely unexplored.  The primary aim of this study was to examine such a  
relationship between trait expressivity and cognitive functioning.  Specifically persons 
high in expressivity were expected to have greater working memory performance than 
persons low in expressivity.  Additionally, it was thought that intrusive thinking thinking 
about stressful life events would mediate the relationship between emotional expressivity 
and working memory performance.   
 Seventy-four healthy, undergraduate men and women participated in this research 
study in exchange for extra credit for their psychology courses.  The Berkeley 
Expressivity Questionnaire was used to assess individual levels of emotional 
expressivity.  Working memory capacity was assessed via 1) the Digit Span Backwards 
portion of the Digit Span subtest from the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale – 3rd Edition 
and 2) Turner & Engle’s (1989) Arithmetic Operation Word Memory Span Test.  
Participants also completed a series of self-report questionnaires assessing depressive, 
anxious, and intrusive thinking symptoms to determine the differential impact of 
depression, anxiety and intrusive thinking on working memory performance. 
 ix 
 
 Multiple regression procedures revealed that overall trait expressivity was largely 
unrelated to working memory performance.  However, individuals characterized as 
highly expressive about negative emotions performed worse on the Digit Span 
Backwards task than those who were less expressive about negative events.  Positive 
expressivity was unrelated to working memory function.  Findings from this study also 
support previous findings that intrusive thinking mediates the relationship between stress 
and working memory, but failed to support the hypothesis that emotional expressivity is a 
universally adaptive coping style that facilitates working memory functioning. 
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    I.  Introduction  
 
Several converging lines of research suggest that emotional expressivity, the 
degree to which people outwardly display their emotions, influences physiological and 
psychological functioning (Rasmussen, 2003).  Research to date concludes that emotion 
expression influences social interactions (Friedman & Riggio, 1981; Sullins, 1991, see 
Campos, Mumme, Kermoian, & Campos, 1994), psychological functioning (Gross & 
Levenson, 1997), and physical well-being (Ewart & Kolodner, 1994) (see also 
Pennebaker, 2003).  Indeed, there is growing support for the psychological and 
physiological benefits of emotion expression.  Whole books have been written exploring 
the beneficial effect of emotional disclosure through writing on immunity, physiological 
functioning and psychological (Lepore & Smyth, 2002; Pennebaker, 1997).  A meta-
analytic review of this literature concludes that these effects are substantial, reliable and 
warrant further investigation into the mechanisms underlying the link between emotion 
expression and health (Smyth, 1998).   
Evidence is emerging that emotion expression and inhibition – active suppression 
of emotionally expressive behaviors -- are also related to neurocognitive functioning.  
Expression of emotions through writing is associated with improvements in working 
memory capacity (Klein & Boals, 2001a) and inhibition of emotions results in short-term 
visual memory deficits (Richards & Gross, 2000).  Taken together, results of these 
experiments suggest that emotion expression may play a role in cognitive function.  They 
also point toward a theoretical mechanism by which this may occur.  To illustrate, 
emotion suppression results in an increase in intrusive thinking that depletes cognitive 
resources necessary to facilitate higher-level cognitive tasks, such as sustained and 
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divided attention, working memory and executive functions (Wegner, 1994; Wegner, 
Quillian & Houston, 1996).  Alternatively, emotion expression lessens ruminative 
thinking about traumatic and everyday stressful experiences, reducing cognitive load and 
freeing cognitive resources to allow for enhanced neurocognitive functioning (Klein, 
2002).  Despite preliminary findings supporting the hypothesis that emotion expression 
facilitates working memory, no studies to date have investigated the specific nature of the 
relationship between individual differences in emotional expressivity and neurocognitive 
function.  This link between expressivity and cognitive function is underdeveloped and 
warrants investigation.   
Research in neuropsychology is making strides toward understanding the 
contributory role of personality in the experience of cognitive dysfunction.  An 
understanding of the potential contributory individual factors, such as emotional 
expressivity, toward one’s experience of cognitive dysfunction may be helpful in treating 
patients complaining of mild, medically unexplained symptoms of forgetfulness and 
impaired concentration.  If it is found that persons low in emotion expression experience 
greater cognitive deficits than persons high in expression, interventions geared toward 
increasing expressivity among the former group would be empirically driven and may 
help to improve cognitive functioning among those with mild cognitive deficits.  
The proposed study investigated the relationship between emotional expressivity 
and cognitive function.  Specifically, it was hypothesized that emotional expressivity may 
predict the degree to which one experiences deficits in working memory.  Because this 
relationship is likely to be most apparent under conditions of high stress (Kiecolt-Glaser, 
McGuire, Robles & Glaser, 2002), this study investigated the relationship between 
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emotional expressivity and working memory while taking into account individual levels 
of stress.  Theoretical support for this research endeavor has been drawn from cross-
discipline research in the fields of health psychology, neuropsychology and cognitive 
psychology.  A review of this literature follows.  
A.  A Revolution in Emotion Research 
 Candace Pert, one of the leading scientists in psychoneuroimmunology (PNI) 
research, stated, “We’re well into a [scientific] revolution, which has to do with 
incorporating the mind and emotions back into a science” (Moyers, 1993, p. 191).  Now, 
a decade later, this revolution is in full effect.  The past several years have seen a 
resurgence of interest in the area of emotions.  There is growing momentum toward an 
understanding of how emotions affect biological, psychological, social and cognitive 
processes.  This interest has been forged through a variety of research initiatives which 
collectively highlight the need for continued cross-discipline studies designed to illustrate 
how emotion may influence all aspects of functioning.  Specific subfields in psychology 
have advanced the science of emotions by investigating their role in basic human 
processes.  PNI studies demonstrate that one’s experience of emotion plays an integral 
role in the mechanical workings of the immune system.  For example, emotions provoke 
a sequence of neuroendocrine changes, producing ameliorative or deleterious effects on 
cardiovascular and immune functioning, depending on the chronicity and severity of the 
alteration (see reviews, Kiecolt-Glaser et al., 2002; Pelletier, 1992).  There is agreement 
that the link the relationship between emotions and immunity is due in part to individual 
differences in coping styles.  For example, Scheier & Bridges (1995) found that 
individual coping style, such as emotionally repressive coping, influences the onset and 
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course of illness.  Findings in these studies point toward emotionally expressive coping as 
an influential factor in limiting disease progression (e.g., Stanton et al., 2000).   
Growing interest in the relationship between emotion and neurocognitive 
functioning comes on the heels of advances in neuroscience enabling scientists to locate 
areas in the brain that are active in emotional processes.  Neuroimaging studies have 
localized areas of the brain that affect and are affected by emotion.  For example, 
Davidson and colleagues (2002) identified patterns of lateralized hemispheric activity 
that are associated with affective personality traits.  Along these lines, multidisciplinary 
research has begun to explore how emotion regulation influences brain activity.  There is 
mounting evidence that emotional and cognitive processes are interwoven in everyday 
life (Damasio, 1994).  While emotions historically have been conceptualized as “pirates 
of logic,” capable of interfering with one’s ability to reason and act appropriately, 
emotions are now viewed as one regulatory aspect within a multifaceted system of 
biopsychosocial interactions (see reviews, Cacioppo & Gardner, 1999).  Emotions appear 
to regulate cognitive functions such as attention, perception, reasoning and information 
processing (Campos et al., 1994), although the mechanisms are not entirely clear.   
B.  Emotional Expressivity 
1.  Conceptualizing Emotional Expressivity 
 
 Emotions may be conceptualized as impulses that have physiological, cognitive 
and behavioral correlates.  To illustrate, fear elicits the physiological sympathetic “fight 
or flight” response, may be accompanied by particular thoughts (e.g., “This situation is 
dangerous.”), and may elicit action (e.g., running).  Individuals differ in the degree to 
which they act on these emotion impulses (Gross & John, 1997).  While some people are 
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quite open and expressive, others are more reserved in their social expression of emotion.  
These differences are present from infancy (Kagan & Snidman, 1991; Weinberg, 
Tronick, Olson & Cohn, 1999) and represent a generalized response tendency in people 
that has been termed “emotional expressivity” (“EE”).   
Broadly conceptualized, EE refers to the degree to which an individual actively 
expresses emotional experience through verbal or nonverbal behaviors (Kring, Smith & 
Neale, 1994) and includes expression of both positive and negative emotions.  According 
to Gross and John (1997), “an individual is emotionally expressive to the extent that he or 
she manifests emotional impulses behaviorally (p.435).”  Emotional expressivity 
encompasses a broad range of verbal and nonverbal behaviors such as crying, making eye 
contact and frowning.  Expressive behavior may be elicited in response to acute (falling 
and bruising your knee) or chronic (divorce proceedings) events, as well as to 
intrapersonal (feeling pain) or extrapersonal (seeing an accident) stimuli.  As such, 
expressive behavior is most evident in the wake of stressors; it may occur in response to a 
variety of stimuli that elicit an emotional response either because they are perceived as 
aversive (distress) or because they are perceived of as pleasant (eustress).  In sum, 
stressful events elicit a chain of psychophysiological responses or emotion states that a 
person may choose to act on or to suppress (Cacioppo & Gardner, 1999).  These 
behaviors act, at least to some degree, as socially adaptive coping mechanisms.    
 a.  Emotional expressivity as a trait coping style.
Functionalist theories of emotion emphasize this social-relational aspect of 
emotion and posit that emotions function as adaptive mechanisms (Campos et al., 1994; 
Greenberg, 2002).  In other words, emotions incline an individual to act in certain ways, 
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and expression of feeling may facilitate coping and adjustment.  To illustrate, crying out 
in an expression of pain encourages social interaction ultimately serveing to alleviate the 
pain or facilitate coping with it (i.e., child falls, cries and mother bandages and kisses 
wounded knee).   
Coping is often characterized as the mediator of emotional reactions to stressful 
life events which serves different functions.  For example, coping may facilitate problem 
solving, protect self-esteem, shape social interactions or regulate emotions (Folkman & 
Lazarus, 1988).  Emotion regulation, a type of coping behavior, involves response 
selection and modification insofar as a person inhibits or expresses emotion 
physiologically, cognitively and behaviorally, as described above (Lepore, Greenberg, 
Bruno & Smyth, 2002).  Thompson (1993) defines emotion regulation as the extrinsic 
and intrinsic processes responsible for monitoring, evaluating and modifying emotional 
reactions.  Similarly, EE may be conceived as a trait manifestation of emotional 
regulation in that it describes an individual’s tendency to self-regulate emotions through 
expressive behaviors (Kring, Smith & Neale, 1994).  Expressing one’s emotions about a 
stressful experience may be one way of engaging in emotional regulation (Creamer, 
1995).  In essence, EE refers to a trait coping style that lies on a continuum from active 
behavioral expression of emotional experience to suppression of emotion impulses.     
2.  Measuring Emotional Expressivity 
An understanding of the core components of EE and a method of measuring the 
trait are essential to the success of studies investigating the role of EE in various human 
processes.  Measures relevant to EE range from handwriting analysis and heart rate 
assessment to peer reports of expressive behavior and laboratory based analyses of facial 
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emotion expression in response to stimuli (Gross & John, 1997).  However, self-report 
questionnaires are the most frequently used method of assessing expressivity.  This 
method has proven to be a valid and reliable reflection of trait expressivity, as there is 
strong agreement between peer ratings of expressivity, physiological markers of 
expressivity, and responses to items on these questionnaires (Gross & John, 1997; Gross 
& John, 1998; Kring et al., 1994).   
Debate continues regarding whether expressivity should be viewed as a 
unifactorial or multifactorial construct.  While some have conceptualized expressivity as 
a simple unitary construct (a continuum from high to low expressive) (Kring, Smith & 
Neale, 1994), recent conceptualizations point toward a multifactorial model (Gross & 
John, 1998).  Factor analysis of EE questionnaires demonstrates that expressivity loads 
on three factors:  Positive Expressivity, Negative Expressivity, and Impulse Strength 
(Gross & John, 1997; King & Emmons, 1990; Trierweiler, Eid & Lischetzke, 2002).  For 
example, respondents who endorse the following type of statements would score high on 
Impulse Strength:  “I experience my emotions very strongly.”  Persons endorsing 
statements such as, “I laugh out loud when someone tells me a joke that I think is funny” 
would likely score high on Positive Expressivity.  High scores on Negative Expressivity 
are obtained by affirmative responses to such statements as, “It is difficult for me to hide 
my fear.”  Although individuals do differ in the degree to which they express positive 
versus negative emotions, persons who typically express negative emotion also express 
more positive emotions as well (Gross & John, 1997).   
Gross and John (1998) have produced the most comprehensive study to date in 
defining the domain of EE.  They examined six self-report expressivity questionnaires 
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(Emotional Expressivity Scale, Emotional Expressivity Questionnaire, Berkeley 
Expressivity Questionnaire, Affect Communications Test, Affect Intensity Measure and 
Self-Monitoring Scale) and then evaluated the relationship between EE and group 
characteristics (i.e., sex and ethnicity), general personality traits (i.e., the Big Five), and 
affective psychological states (i.e., depressive affect, self-esteem and self-consciousness).  
In doing so, they confirmed a five-factor structure of general EE that is comprised of 
Expressive Confidence, Positive Expressivity, Negative Expressivity, Impulse Intensity 
and Masking.  See Figure 1.  Replicating previous work, they found that Core Emotional 
Expressivity includes Impulse Strength and Positive and Negative Expressivity.  Positive 
and Negative Expressivity correlated with positive and negative affect, respectively, as 
measured by the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS).  In addition, Positive 
Expressivity was correlated with the Agreeableness and Openness to Experience 
subscales of the NEO Personality Inventory, while Negative Expressivity was correlated 
with the Neuroticism scale.  In sum, it appears that questionnaire methods of assessing 
EE are reliable measures that demonstrate adequate convergent and discriminant validity 
in identifying individual differences in EE.  These researchers also identified Expressive 
Confidence and Masking as aspects of EE.   Expressive Confidence refers to one’s ability 
to produce situation-appropriate emotion expressions, while Masking refers to one’s 
attempts to conceal emotions from others.  While Gross & John (1998) found that 
Expressive Confidence is associated with Extraversion and that Masking is associated 
with attempts to hide strong negative feelings, they conclude that Core Emotional 
Expressivity (Positive and Negative Expressivity and Impulse Strength) reflects the 
behavioral expression of emotion in everyday life.  As such, this triad of Core Emotional 
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Expressivity is most salient in studies of the effects of emotion expressive behaviors on 
physical, psychological and cognitive health.   
C.  Emotional Expressivity, Health and Cognition 
1.  Emotional Expressivity and Health 
The idea that EE may influence health outcomes is based in part on findings of 
early PNI studies.  Although the findings are controversial, several researchers report that 
suppression of negative emotion may increase the risk of cancer or be a marker for cancer 
susceptibility (Gross, 1989; Kune, Kune, Watson, & Bahnson, 1991; Shaffer, Graves, 
Swank, & Pearson, 1987, Stanton et al., 2000).  Alternatively confrontive coping (i.e., 
expressing anger) predicts a better chance of survival in breast cancer patients (Rodin & 
Salovey, 1989).  Given these findings, it seems that coping styles that inhibit the 
disclosure of stressful or traumatic experiences are associated with poor physical health 
outcomes.  
A greater understanding of the role of EE in social, psychological, and physical 
wellness arenas has emerged through these early investigations.  Armed with a better 
conceptualization of the EE construct, researchers have sought to determine the clinical 
relevance of assessing EE in their patients and designed interventions to foster physical 
and psychological health by altering individuals’ expressive behavior.  Support for the 
regulatory role of EE has emerged through these investigations.  Specifically, the 
importance of EE in facilitating social interaction is well-documented (Friedman & 
Riggio, 1981; Sullins, 1991), such that emotion expression promotes group cohesion.  
Emotional expressivity is associated with higher self-reported psychological well-being 
(Gross & Levenson, 1997) and emotion expression appears to attenuate depressive 
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symptoms (Lepore, 1997).  The positive effects of emotionally expressive coping on 
health outcomes such as blood pressure, has been established (Ewart & Kolodner, 1994).  
Furthermore, there is an overwhelming literature documenting the beneficial effects of 
emotionally expressive writing on physical and psychological well-being (Pennebaker, 
2003; Smyth, 1998).  Collectively, results of these studies demonstrate that higher levels 
of expressivity are associated with better psychological, social and physiological 
outcomes. 
2.  Theoretical Explanations  
Several theories exist as to why persons who act upon or express emotions report 
more positive social interactions, endorse greater feelings of well-being and demonstrate 
improved physical health.  While each of these theories originates from a different 
perspective, they offer unique contributions to understanding EE from a biopsychosocial 
perspective.  The functionalist theory emphasizes the social-relational aspect of EE and 
posits that expression of emotions surrounding stressful life events or traumas acts as an 
adaptive coping mechanism that elicits increased social support.  Indeed, social support is 
known to be a moderating factor in the relationship between stress and health (Esterling, 
Kiecolt-Glaser, Bodnar & Glaser, 1994).  Biologically based theories suggests that failure 
to express feelings results in high levels of negative affect which has physiological 
consequences such as changes in neuroendocrine and immunological pathways (Petrie, 
Booth & Pennebaker, 1998).  Alternatively, cognitive psychological theories postulate 
that expression of emotions surrounding trauma or stressful events allows for integration 
of the event into existing schema (Foa & Kozak, 1986) and, in turn, allows one to draw 
meaning from the experience (Harvey, Orbuch, Chwalisz, & Garwood, 1991).   
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It is this cognitive organization theory that has garnered increasing attention 
recently.  As referred to above, a vast literature exists documenting the beneficial effects 
of emotionally expressive writing on psychological and physical health outcomes (Lepore 
& Smyth, 2002).  Specifically, writing about the thoughts and feelings surrounding 
stressful or traumatic events produces reliable positive effects on psychological 
functioning (i.e., reduced anxiety, depression) and physical functioning (i.e., increased 
immunity) (see review, Esterling, L’Abate, Murray, & Pennebaker, 1999).  Expression of 
emotions surrounding stressful life events through writing appears to foster 
reorganization and integration of previously unattended to emotions and cognitions, 
resulting in improved psychological functioning and immunity (Lepore, et al., 2002).  
Clearly, there is abundant interest in understanding and explaining the relationships 
among emotions, expressivity and health.  While the literature in this area continues to 
grow and documents the powerful positive effect of emotional disclosure through writing 
on various measures of health and well-being, little attention has been paid to the role that 
expression of emotions plays in higher-order cognitive processes such as attention, 
memory and executive functions.   
3.  Cognitive Consequences of Emotion Expression Versus Suppression 
 While little is known about the effects of emotion expression on cognitive 
function, preliminary evidence suggests that expression and, alternatively, suppression of 
emotion are related to neurocognitive function.  Klein & Boals (2001a) investigated 
whether written emotional expression leads to gains in working memory.  These 
experimenters tested two groups of undergraduates on a computerized working memory 
task at six intervals to determine whether an emotional disclosure writing intervention 
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would facilitate improvements in working memory, presumably by reducing stress.  After 
seven weeks, the experimental group that had engaged in the emotionally expressive 
writing exercise demonstrated improvements in working memory compared to those 
assigned to a nonexpressive writing task (Klein & Boals, 2001a).  Based on these 
findings, they concluded that the emotional aspects of stress, when unexpressed or 
suppressed, may compete for attentional resources, thereby causing poorer performance 
on working memory tasks.  
 Similarly, Richards and Gross (2000) demonstrated that suppression of emotion – 
the conscious inhibition of overt emotion expressive behavior -- results in decrements in 
memory functioning.  Through a series of three experiments, these investigators 
documented decrements in memory functioning as a result of expressive suppression.  
Participants were randomly assigned to one of two groups and were required to watch an 
emotionally evocative film clip.  The experimental group was instructed to avoid overt 
emotionally expressive behavior while watching the film; the control group was not 
restricted in their emotion expressive behavior and was instructed to simply watch the 
film.  Persons instructed to suppress the emotions associated with watching the negative 
film clips demonstrated poorer memory for the content of the clips (Richards & Gross, 
2000).  Given these findings, the authors conclude that perhaps memory problems should 
be added to the list of negative consequences associated with inhibition of emotion 
impulses.  Moreover, expression of emotions may enhance memory functioning, and 
particularly working memory,  possibly because of the organizational, regulatory effect 
of expressive coping on such cognitive tasks.  However, before discussing proposed 
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mechanistic models, it is important to understand the complex nature of working memory 
functioning.  
D.  Working Memory 
1.  Working Memory as a Limited Capacity System 
The dynamic cognitive process of holding information in consciousness and 
applying that information toward goal-oriented actions is termed working memory 
(WM).  Because information must be selected for storage and processing, inhibition of 
irrelevant information is a necessary consequence of WM processes.  Pennington (1994) 
characterizes WM as a “limited capacity computational arena” (p.248) which is 
responsible for both storage and processing. While Pennington’s model differs in 
complexity from other models of WM (e.g. Baddeley, 1996), the essential elements 
remain the same.  First, WM is a prefrontally mediated process.  Functional MRI studies 
demonstrate that cognitive tasks designed to tax WM are associated with increased 
prefrontal activity (Jonides et al., 1997), thus confirming that WM is a higher-level 
executive cognitive function.  Second, WM is a limited capacity system.  Performance on 
executive functions tasks such as WM, is dependent upon directed attention (Roberts & 
Pennington, 1996).  Thus WM performance is dependent upon selection of relevant 
stimuli for processing and inhibition of irrelevant information.  
The idea that attentional resources must be shared among task relevant and 
irrelevant demands is empirically supported (Teasdale et al., 1995).  Attending to off-task 
demands depletes cognitive resources necessary for intact executive and WM functioning 
(Stoltzfus, Hasher, & Zacks, 1996).  Several researchers have found that WM capacity 
and storage decreases in the presence of irrelevant, off-task, competing demands 
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(Blackwood, MacHale, Power, Goodwin & Lawrie, 1998).  These off-task demands may 
take the form of external sensory inputs (i.e., visual or auditory stimuli).  Similarly, 
internal stimuli such as thoughts (thinking about what to buy at the grocery store) or 
feelings (pain) may also compete for attentional resources.  As such, WM is highly 
susceptible to the internal distractors wrought by life stress.  
Individuals differ in their ability to perform WM functions and WM capacity is 
substantially related to measures of intelligence (Pennington, 1994).  In fact, WM is 
predictive of IQ, particularly fluid intelligence measures, such that persons with high 
WM abilities perform better on reasoning, problem solving and novel computational 
tasks (Pennington, 1994).  Conversely, impairments in WM affect one’s ability to 
perform everyday tasks.  Hasher & colleagues (1991) demonstrated that deficits in WM 
affect one’s ability to speak logically, comprehend information, encode and retrieve 
memories, and to perform other complex cognitive tasks such problem-solving and 
reasoning.  Apparently, one’s ability to perform everyday cognitive tasks effects and is 
affected by WM capacity. 
2.  Stress and Working Memory 
It is common for people to report mild to moderate cognitive symptoms such as 
difficulty concentrating, forgetfulness and impaired decision making in the wake of 
significant trauma (e.g., assault, death of a loved one).  Clinical observations also suggest 
that these symptoms are commonly experienced by persons reporting a large number of 
everyday life stressors (e.g., caregiving, financial strain).  Although it appears that 
significant trauma and the cumulative effect of a number of smaller stressors has a 
negative impact on neurocognitive functions, the mechanisms are unclear.  What little is 
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known about the underlying mechanisms in the relationship between stress and cognitive 
function comes from studies of persons with acute anxiety or depressive disorders.  The 
overall conclusion is that affective disorders are associated with decreased neurocognitive 
function (Darke, 1988; Sorg & Whitney, 1992). However, the direct relationship between 
life stress and cognitive function, or life stress and subclinical anxiety or depression, 
remains largely unexplored.   
A series of studies investigating the effects of life stress on cognitive function 
demonstrate that higher levels of life stress are associated with impairments on WM tasks 
(Klein & Barnes, 1994; Klein, 1995; Klein & Boals, 2001b).  In these studies, the 
investigators measured self-reported stress among undergraduate students and examined 
the relationship between stress and performance on problem solving and WM tasks.  
Persons reporting high levels of stress consistently performed worse on WM and problem 
solving tasks than persons reporting lower levels of stress.  This relationship was 
especially strong when the demands of the WM task were high (Klein & Boals, 2001b).   
3.  Intrusive thinking as a mediator between stress and working memory deficits 
One theory as to why stress affects performance on WM tasks and real-life 
problem solving points to intrusive thinking as a mediating factor.  This theory, proposed 
by Klein (2002), suggests that the intrusive thinking that often accompanies stress acts as 
a distractor from the to-be-attended-to stimulus.   As described above, WM refers to 
one’s capacity to direct attention toward a stimulus or task while screening out irrelevant 
stimuli (Engle, Kane & Tuholski, 1999).  Internal feeling states (e.g., hunger, pain, 
fatigue) and intrusive thoughts (e.g., thinking about items on your grocery list as you 
drive past the supermarket) may serve as distractors from a particular task at hand.  
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Insofar as persons reporting high levels of stress experience more intrusive thoughts that 
compete for attention with other, more relevant stimuli, they may be impaired on WM 
related functions.   
It is common for individuals to ruminate over stressful events (Tait & Silver, 
1989).  An increase in intrusive and/or ruminative thinking is common following stressful 
experiences (see review, Horowitz, 1975).  Wegner’s (1994) ironic processing model 
states that suppression of emotionally evocative thoughts, such as those associated with 
stressors, results in sympathetic arousal.  Suppression of these thoughts also results in a 
“rebound effect” – an increase in intrusive thoughts following suppression of the 
emotional stimulus – which has physiological (Wegner & Gold, 1995) and cognitive 
(Wegner & Erber, 1992; Wegner et al., 1996) correlates.  Specifically, studying under 
cognitive loads leads to better memory for items that subjects were told to inhibit 
remembering compared to studying in the absence of cognitive load.  These findings 
suggest that cognitive load increases intrusive thinking which has direct effects on one’s 
ability to attend to, process and remember information.   
The relationship between intrusive, ruminative thinking about stressors and 
negative mood has been well-established (e.g., Lutgendorf, Antoni, Kumar & 
Schneiderman, 1994; Tait & Silver, 1989).  Ruminative thinking among persons with 
anxiety and depressive disorders is common.  Not only do affective disorders such as 
anxiety and depression negatively affect one’s ability to perform cognitive tasks, but 
personality traits such as anxiety, sensitivity to somatic symptoms and neuroticism are 
also associated with poor neuropsychological test performance (Boone & Lu, 1999; 
Bosma & Kessels, 2002).  For example, empirical evidence demonstrates that anxiety 
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interferes with the storage and processing capacity of WM (e.g., Darke, 1988; Sorg & 
Whitney, 1992), presumably because anxiety-related intrusive, ruminative thinking 
interferes with one’s ability to attend to task-relevant demands.  Thus, it may be that 
persons who are predisposed to ruminative thinking, either because of transient 
psychopathology or because of stable personality traits, experience difficulty in 
performing everyday cognitive tasks, particularly when under stress.  
 Individuals vary in the degree to which they experience stress, and thus in the 
degree to which they would need to inhibit off-task demands (such as intrusive thinking) 
when performing WM functions.  Several researchers have found that WM capacity and 
storage decreases in the presence of irrelevant, off-task, competing demands (e.g., 
Blackwood et al., 1998).  For example, intrusive thoughts interfere with everyday tasks 
that are cognitively demanding such as proofreading (Baum, Cohen & Hall, 1993).   
To date, few studies have examined the mediating effects of ruminative thinking 
on physical health and psychological well-being.  While some have failed to clearly 
demonstrate this relationship (e.g., Paez, Velasco, & Gonzalez, 1999), much clinical and 
experimental data support the notion that cognitive processing of stressful experiences 
reduces intrusive thinking (Creamer, 1995; Greenberg, 1995; Harvey, Orbuch, Chwalisz 
& Garwood, 1991).  For example, Lepore (1997) found that expressive writing attenuated 
the effect of intrusive thoughts on depressive symptoms in a population of students under 
acute stress, but did not lessen the frequency of intrusive thoughts per se.   
Klein & Boals (2001b) are the only investigators to directly test the hypothesis 
that intrusive thinking mediates the relationship between stress and cognitive abilities.  In 
a series of three experiments, they found that for persons reporting high levels of stress, 
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the frequency of intrusive thoughts was associated with impairments on WM tasks, and 
that the relationship between stress and WM capacity was mediated by intrusive thinking 
(Klein & Boals, 2001b).  To illustrate, these investigators found that higher self-reported 
life stress as measured by the Life Experiences Scale (LES; Sarason, Johnson & Siegel, 
1979) was positively correlated with WM performance on Turner and Engle’s (1989) 
Arithmetic Operation Word Memory Span Task (OSPAN)1.  They also found that 
intrusive thinking as measured by the Impact of Events Scale (IES; Horowitz, Wilner & 
Alvarez, 1979) was significantly associated with life stress and with OSPAN 
performance.  Finally, they determined that the strength of the relationship between stress 
and WM performance was reduced when controlling for intrusive thinking.  See Figure 2.  
As illustrated, Klein and Boals (2001b) conclude that intrusive thinking mediates the 
relationship between stress and WM performance.   
E.  Stress, Emotional Expressivity, and Working Memory 
1.  Klein’s Model of Stress, Expressive Writing and Working Memory 
Based on her studies of stress, working memory and written emotional disclosure, 
Klein (2002) has outlined a model of how expressive writing increases WM capacity.  
This model has four primary assumptions: 
1. Memories of stressful experiences initially have different cognitive 
representations than memories of nonstressful experiences; 
2. Stressful memories are highly accessible because they elicit intrusive thoughts; 
3.  Stressful memories consume attentional resources; and 
                                                          
1 Turner and Engle’s (1989) OSPAN task is a computerized arithmetic and word span test.  Subjects are instructed to read aloud 
simple arithmetic equations that are followed by a one-syllable word.  Sets of 2-7 operations with associated words are presented, and 
subjects are required to write down as many of the words as they can remember at the conclusion of each set. 
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4. Developing a coherent narrative about a stressful experience reduces stress-
related intrusive thinking, thereby freeing attentional resources for working 
memory tasks. 
Klein’s theory proposes that stressful life events are highly accessible via 
intrusive thoughts based on Wegner’s ironic processing model.  These intrusive thoughts 
compete for attentional resources, thereby compromising WM ability due to the fact that 
it is a limited capacity system.  Because expressive writing promotes organization of 
stressful experiences and appears to reduce intrusive thinking about stressors, writing 
about stressors frees up cognitive resources that can be used to direct attention to relevant 
demands.  Indeed, Klein’s model provides a framework by which to test whether 
individual psychosocial variables influence the relationship between stress and WM.  
Specifically, Klein and her colleagues have demonstrated that WM declines under stress, 
and that an intervention designed to elicit emotion expression promotes improved WM 
function among stressed individuals.  However, Klein’s model fails to account for 
individual differences in coping style that may influence the relationship between stress 
and WM.  As described previously, emotionally expressive coping leads to gains in 
physical and psychological health, and written emotional expression is associated with 
gains in WM.  Given this, it would seem that individuals with emotionally expressive 
coping styles may be protected against the negative effects of stress and associated stress-
related intrusive thinking.  Because expression of emotions is a form of emotion 
regulation which attenuates the negative impact of stress on WM, it may be that persons 
who typically express emotions in response to stress – those high in EE -- may perform 
 20 
 
better on higher-level cognitive tasks such as WM than those persons who are less 
emotionally expressive.  See Figure 3. 
F.  Proposed Study 
This study was an exploration and elaboration of Klein’s model (2002).  
Collectively, experiments conducted by Klein and her colleagues suggest that expressive 
writing results in working memory improvements via decreases in intrusive thinking.  
Her model suggests that stress-induced intrusive thinking mediates the relationship 
between stress and WM.  However, this model fails to account for individual differences 
in coping style, and precludes drawing any conclusions about who benefits the most from 
emotionally expressive writing.   
Certainly, individuals respond differently to life stressors.  While some 
individuals become overtly distressed over seemingly minor difficulties, others appear to 
withstand a great deal before their emotion responses are evidenced in behavior.  As 
such, it is plausible that those who act on emotion impulses will experience fewer 
competing intrusive thoughts that could conceivably interfere with one’s ability to sustain 
attention to relevant stimuli, compared to those who suppress the emotion impulses.  
Therefore, expression of emotions may free up cognitive resources needed for sustained 
attention in WM tasks.   
One of the critiques of the expressive writing literature is that research has not 
determined for whom emotion expression interventions is beneficial.  Klein’s model 
proposes that expressive writing may be used as an intervention to reduce stress-related 
intrusive thinking and to improve WM abilities.  However, it may be that emotionally 
expressive persons may benefit less from such an exercise than those who tend to inhibit, 
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suppress or do not act on emotion impulses, or vice versa.  Inclusion of coping style as a 
predictor of working memory performance may add a new dimension to Klein’s model of 
stress and working memory.  To illustrate, see Figure 3.  It is hypothesized that persons 
who typically express their emotions will experience less stress-related intrusive thinking 
and will perform better on WM tasks than persons who do not express emotions.   
G.  Summary and Implications 
Little is known about the contributory role of personality factors toward 
neuropsychological functioning.  Some studies attempted to correlate personality profiles 
with cognitive performance and other studies investigated the influence of affective 
disorders such as depression, anxiety on cognitive functioning (e.g., Boone & Lu, 1999; 
Bosma & Kessels, 2002; Darke, 1988; Greiffenstein & Baker, 2001).  However, there is 
little understanding about how individual factors such as cognitive processing style, 
coping strategies, or specific personality traits contribute to one’s overall cognitive 
functioning.  As such, the relationship between EE and neurocognitive functioning is 
relatively unexplored.   
Compelling research in the health psychology literature demonstrates that written 
emotional disclosure about past traumas has significant, positive and long-lasting effects 
on physical health (Francis & Pennebaker, 1992; Pennebaker & Beall, 1986; Pennebaker, 
Colder & Sharp, 1990; Pennebaker, Kiecolt-Glaser & Glaser, 1988).  Recent theories 
regarding these findings point toward the role of emotion expression as an adaptive 
coping mechanism for reorganizing one’s experience of stress or trauma.  This theory has 
propelled investigations regarding the potential ameliorative effects of emotionally 
expressive writing on neurocognitive functioning.  Thus far, only two studies (Richards 
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& Gross, 2000; Klein & Boals, 2001a) have investigated whether emotion expression has 
the same positive effects on cognitive functioning as it does on physical health.  The 
results of both studies suggest that emotion expression is associated with cognitive 
improvements and that emotional suppression has negative cognitive consequences.  
 Klein’s (2002) model of the relationships among stress, intrusive thinking and 
WM provides a forum for answering the question of whether coping factors may indeed 
influence cognitive function.  Specifically, her model suggests that emotion expression 
enhances WM function, which is mediated by reductions in intrusive thinking.  The 
proposed study is an attempt to clarify the relationships among trait emotional 
expressivity, intrusive thinking and neuropsychological functioning.  Specifically, this 
study examined whether expressive persons perform better on tests of working memory, 
and assessed the mediating effects of intrusive thinking about stressful life events on this 
relationship.  It was hypothesized that emotionally expressive coping would be associated 
with reduced impact of stress on WM, based on prior findings that emotion expression 
facilitates cognitive restructuring of stressful events and also reduces competing intrusive 
thoughts about stressful life events.   
Because emotional expressivity is a multifactorial construct, the relationship 
between general emotional expressivity (“EE”) and working memory was evaluated 
separately, in addition to the individual relationships among Positive emotional 
expressivity (“Positive expressivity”), Negative emotional expressivity (“Negative 
expressivity”), and working memory (“WM”). 
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II.  Statement of the Problem 
Preliminary evidence suggests that emotion expression lead to gains in 
neurocognitive functioning, while emotion suppression reduces cognitive capacity, 
particularly working memory.   However, whether individual differences in emotional 
expressivity influence cognitive function is unknown.  Theoretically founded on Klein’s 
(2002) model, this study aimed to 1) examine the relationship between general emotional 
expressivity and working memory, and 2) to test the theory that intrusive thinking about 
stressful life events mediates the relationship between emotional expressivity and 
working memory performance.   
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III.  Hypotheses 
Aim 1  Examine the relationship between emotional expressivity (EE) and working 
memory (WM). 
Hypothesis 1a. EE (Berkeley Expressivity Questionnaire (BEQ) total score) will 
predict WM performance as measured by 1) Digits Backwards subtest of the WAIS-III 
(DPSAN) and 2) Arithmetic Operation Word Memory Span Test (OSPAN).  This 
relationship will exist independent of individual differences in anxiety (as measured by 
the Spielberger State Anxiety Inventory (STAI-State) and depression (as measured by 
Beck Depression Inventory-II (BDI-II)).   
 Hypothesis 1b.  Persons high in EE (BEQ Total) will perform better than those 
low in EE on both WM tasks (DSPAN, OSPAN). 
Aim 2  Test whether intrusive thinking mediates the relationship between emotional 
expressivity and working memory 
Hypothesis 2. Intrusive thinking (IES-Intrusion) about stressful life events will 
mediate the relationship between EE (BEQ Total) and WM (DSPAN, OSPAN).  
Aim 3 (Exploratory)  Explore relationships among positive and negative expressivity (as 
measured by the Positive and Negative Expressivity subscales of the BEQ) and 
performance on working memory (DSPAN, OSPAN) tasks. 
Aim 4 (Exploratory)  Examine the relationship between emotional expressivity (BEQ 
Total) and executive function (Stroop-CW)).  
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IV.  Method 
A.  Participants 
 Participants were 74 healthy, undergraduate men (n = 32) and women (n = 42) 
ranging in age from 18 to 28 (M = 20.5, SD = 1.7).   Power analyses confirmed that a 
sample size this large is sufficient to detect a moderate effect size (e.g., .15, .25, and .3) 
for multiple regression, multiple analysis of variance and correlational analyses, 
respectively, at .80 power.  
 Participants were recruited directly from psychology courses offered at a large 
urban, private university; recruitment extended over the course of approximately one year 
(September 2003 through July 2004).  The majority of the sample identified themselves 
as non-Hispanic White (67.6%).  Approximately 16% of the sample was African 
American.  Nearly 14% self-identified as Asian or Pacific Islander.  The remaining 
participants were Latino (1.4%) and Native American (1.4%).  This distribution is 
comparable to the overall racial/ethnic distribution of students attending the host 
university. 
 The sample was fairly evenly divided among upper- and lowerclassmen:  
freshman (14.9%), sophomores (29.7%), juniors (37.8%) and seniors (17.6%).  
Participants were asked to provide their overall grade point average (GPA) if they were 
sure of what it was; 62 participants provided this information.  GPAs ranged from 2.0 to 
4.0 (on a 0 - 4.0 scale), with a mean of 3.3 (SD =.53).   
 Persons with a history of brain injury, loss of consciousness or neurological 
disease were prohibited from participating in this study as these conditions would likely 
affect WM performance.  Only two volunteers were ineligible to participate; both were 
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excluded due to history of loss of consciousness.  Nineteen students indicated that they 
take medication on a regular basis.  These medications were predominantly oral 
contraceptives (n = 11), allergy or asthma agents (n = 3), antibiotics (n = 3), and 
antidepressants (n = 3).    
B.  Measures 
1.  Demographics and initial information form
 Descriptive information, such as participants’ age, gender, ethnicity, and year in 
school was collected.  Women were also asked to provide the date of the first day of their 
last menstrual period for the purpose of conducting exploratory analyses regarding 
menstrual cycle related changes in cognitive and affective functioning. 
2.  Measures of emotional expressivity 
 Berkeley Expressivity Questionnaire (BEQ; Gross & John, 1995).  The Berkeley 
Expressivity Questionnaire is a 16-item self-report measure of individual differences in 
emotional expressivity.  The BEQ provides three subscale scores (Positive Expressivity, 
Negative Expressivity and Impulse Strength), as well as a Total Expressivity score.  The 
Positive Expressivity subscale is derived from responses to statements such as, “When 
I’m happy, my feelings show.”  The Negative Expressivity subscale is calculated based 
on responses to statements such as, “Whenever I feel negative emotions, people can 
easily see exactly what I’m feeling.”  The third subscale, Impulse Strength, provides a 
general measure of experience of emotion, and includes items such as, “I have strong 
emotions.”  Respondents are asked to rate how true each statement is for them on a likert 
scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).  Responses are averaged 
across items to yield values ranging from 1-7 for each scale.  
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 The three-facet structure of the BEQ is preferable to unifactorial measures of 
expressivity due to accumulating evidence that negative affect is especially associated 
with measures of physical health and well-being.  In a factor analytic study of various 
measures of expressivity, Gross & John (1998) confirmed the three-factor structure of the 
BEQ, and demonstrated that these three factors constitute what is referred to as Core 
Emotional Expressivity.   Additionally, the BEQ shows convergent validity with peer 
ratings of general expressivity and the subscales differentially predict positive and 
negative emotion-expressive behavior in the laboratory (Gross & John, 1997).    BEQ 
Total score was used to classify individuals along a continuum of expressivity in order to 
enable predictions regarding the influence of EE on WM performance.  While BEQ total 
score was used to classify individuals along a continuum of expressivity, the differential 
predictive power of each of the subscales was also explored. 
3.  Measure of intrusive thinking 
 Impact of Events Scale (IES; Horowitz, Wilner & Alvarez, 1979).  The IES was 
developed to assess subjective distress in response to a specific event.  The Scale consists 
of 15 items, seven of which measure intrusive symptoms and eight of which measure 
avoidance symptoms.  Respondents are asked to rate the items on a 4-point likert scale: 0 
(not at all), 1 (rarely), 3 (sometimes) and 5 (often).  The combination of Intrusion and 
Avoidance subscale scores yields a total subjective stress score ranging between 0 and 
75.  Criterion validity for the Intrusion and Avoidance subscales has been shown to detect 
change in individuals’ clinical status over time (Horowitz, Wilner & Alvarez, 1979).  
Internal consistency alphas for the Intrusion subscale (.78) and the Avoidance subscale 
(.82) are high.  The IES has been used in clinical samples to track change in 
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symptomatology over time; both subscales have been used in studies of intrusive thinking 
and thought suppression.  For the purposes of this study, individuals’ scores on Intrusion 
subscale were used as a measure of intrusive thinking to test the hypothesis that  intrusive 
thinking mediates the relationship between total trait EE and WM performance. 
4.  Mood indices
 Beck Depression Inventory-II (BDI-II; Beck, Steer & Brown, 1996).  The BDI-II 
is a 21-item, multiple choice questionnaire that is used to assess the intensity of 
depressive symptoms.  Respondents are required to rate the severity of symptoms they 
have experienced over the previous two-week period in accordance with DSM-IV 
criteria.  The measure has been used extensively in clinical populations and community 
samples, and is among the most widely used depression screening instruments in research 
settings.  Reliability estimates for the BDI-II in predicting depression in these populations 
is high (reliability coefficient = .92).  The BDI-II was chosen for use in this study due to 
its clinical sensitivity as a screening measure for depression.  Total score on the BDI-II 
was included as a predictor variable in regression analyses to determine whether EE 
predicts WM performance above and beyond depression.   
 Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI) (Spielberger, 1983).  This 40-
item, self-report questionnaire provides two measures of anxiety -- state anxiety and trait 
anxiety. Trait anxiety refers to how anxious a person characteristically feels, while State 
anxiety refers to how anxious a person feels at any given moment.  Both state and trait 
anxiety scales have been shown to have high reliability with median α coefficients of.92 
and .90.  While the state anxiety scale demonstrates variability over time, test-retest 
reliability for the trait portion of the scale ranges from .73 to .86.  Because anxiety has 
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been shown to influence performance on cognitive tasks, the STAI was administered in 
order to determine the differential effects of state and trait anxiety on cognitive 
functioning as well as to assess differences in anxiety levels between high and low 
expressive persons.  Individuals’ state anxiety scores were entered as a predictor in the 
regression to evaluate whether EE predicts WM performance above and beyond anxiety.   
5.  Stress measures
 Undergraduate Stress Questionnaire (USQ; Crandall, Preisler & Aussprung, 
1992).  The USQ is a self-report rating scale of current life stressors developed 
specifically for use with undergraduate populations.  The scale contains 82 commonly 
experienced stressors (both eustress and distress items), and respondents are instructed to 
indicate which stressors they have experienced over the course of the past semester.  
Items from the questionnaire include the following: a) death of family member or friend; 
b) had lots of tests; c) no sleep; and d) had to ask for money.  Endorsed items are 
assigned a score of “1”, and the number of items endorsed is tallied to create a total score. 
The mean score of undergraduate students on the USQ is 17.63, with a standard deviation 
of 7.93.  Scores between 16 and 23 are considered average, while persons scoring above 
40 are indicative of very high levels of stress.  The USQ demonstrates sensitivity to 
change in stress level over time (e.g., students scored higher on USQ during finals weeks 
as compared to beginning of term); test-retest reliability ranged from .59 to .69.  In 
addition, undergraduate students rated items on the USQ as more complete and accurate 
in depicting common stressors than the Holmes-Rahe and the Daily Stress Inventory.  
The USQ will be used to quantify current level of stress in participants.   
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6.  Tests of cognitive function.  
 Digits Backward (DSPAN; Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale – 3rd Edition 
(WAIS-III), 1997).  The Digit Span Backwards subtest from the WAIS-III is considered 
clinically to be a reliable measure of WM and has been used in research with a variety of 
populations to provide an index of WM capacity.  The DSPAN task consists of a series of 
serially presented digits which the subject is required to repeat in reverse order.  The 
digits are presented at the rate of one digit per second, and trials increase in difficulty 
from a two-digit sequence through a maximum of nine digits.  Two trials are presented at 
each digit load level, such that after completion of two trials at the two-digit level, the 
next trial consists of three digits, etc.  Raw scores on the DSPAN were used as an 
outcome measure of WM performance. 
 Arithmetic Operation-Word Memory Span Task (OSPAN, Turner & Engle, 1989). 
The OSPAN task has been used as a test of WM capacity and has high internal 
consistency (.75) and reliability (.88).  This task consists of a series of simple arithmetic 
operations (e.g., (9 x 1) - 9 = 1) which is followed by a one-syllable word (e.g., back).  
Participants read the problem aloud and then indicate verbally whether the answer given 
to the problem is true or false.  They then read the word aloud.  The experimenter then 
advances the program to the next operation.  After sets of two to seven problems, 
participants are prompted to write down as many of these words as possible from the 
previous set.  Three sequences containing one set of each size are presented, for a total of 
81 operations.  Working memory scores are comprised of the total number of words 
recalled that are associated with correctly solved equations. 
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Stroop Color and Word Test (Stroop;  Golden, 1976). The Stroop test is an easily 
administered screening instrument for identifying deficits in executive functioning.  The 
Stroop has been used widely in both research and clinical settings to differentiate normal 
subjects from brain damaged subjects and as a direct test of executive functioning.  Its 
reliability over time and validity as a screening measure for executive dysfunction has 
been well-established.  Performance on the Stroop is associated with cognitive flexibility, 
resistance to interference from outside stimuli, creativity, and psychopathology—all of 
which influence an individual's ability to cope with cognitive stress.  The test consists of 
3 basic parts:  Word page – the names of colors are printed in black ink; Color page – 
semantically meaningless symbols (X) printed in colored ink; and Word-Color Page - the 
words on the first page are printed in the colors on the second page with the restriction 
that the word and the color do not match.  The subject's task is to look at each sheet and 
move down the columns, reading words or naming the ink colors as quickly as possible, 
within a given time limit. The test yields three scores, based on the number of items 
completed on each of the three stimulus sheets. An interference score, which is useful in 
determining the individual's cognitive flexibility, creativity, and reaction to cognitive 
stress, can also be calculated. 
C.  Procedure 
 Individuals were recruited directly from undergraduate courses at Drexel 
University with the help of two research assistants.  The principal investigator and/or the 
research assistant presented information about the study to each class, describing it as an 
investigation of the role of personality in cognitive functioning.  Interested individuals 
provided their contact information (name, telephone number, email address) and the 
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principal investigator and/or the research assistant contacted potential volunteers to 
schedule an appointment date/time to participate in the study. 
 All participants provided written informed consent to participating in the study.  
Study sessions took place in the Department of Psychology at Drexel University, Main 
Campus.  The approximate time commitment of participants was one hour, during which 
time participants completed a series of self-report questionnaires (USQ, BDI-II, STAI, 
BEQ, and IES) and three neuropsychological tests (DSPAN, OPSAN and Stroop).   
 The cognitive measures were presented in counter-balanced order across subjects.  
Scoring of measures was done at the conclusion of the study so as to maintain blinding of 
experimenter to condition (high/low expressive individuals), thereby controlling for 
expectancy effects.  Upon completion of the study, participants were provided with an 
extra credit voucher (worth 2 points) for the class from which they were recruited.   
D.  Data Analysis 
 Means, standard deviations and distribution of scores for all self-report 
questionnaires and cognitive measures were evaluated.  Bonferroni-corrected t-tests were 
run to evaluate group differences (male versus female; high stress versus low stress) on 
all variables of interest. The “high” versus “mod/low” stress groups were derived based 
on a median split. 
 Two separate stepwise multiple regression analyses were performed with scores 
on the BDI-II, STAI-State and BEQ Total entered as predictor variables and raw scores 
on the DSPAN and OSPAN as dependent variables in order to evaluate the differential 
effect of anxiety, depression and EE on WM performance (Hypothesis 1a).  Additional 
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regression analyses were run to evaluate the mediating effect of intrusive thinking on the 
relationship between stress and WM.   
 In order to evaluate Hypothesis 1b, participants were assigned to one of two 
groups (high EE versus low EE) based on a median split; subjects scoring above the 
sample mean on the BEQ Total scale were characterized as “high EE” and those scoring 
below the sample mean were characterized as “low EE.”  MANCOVA procedures were 
used to test the hypothesis that high EE persons would perform better on WM tasks than 
low EE persons, covarying for individual stress levels (USQ).    
A series of post-hoc exploratory analyses investigated the relationship between 
EE and executive function and between Positive and Negative EE and performance on 
WM tasks.  A 2 x 2 Multiple Analysis of Variance was performed with scores on  
Positive and Negative Expressivity subscales of the BEQ as independent variables and 
raw scores on the OSPAN and DSPAN as the dependent variables to evaluate whether 
the degree to which people expressed positive versus negative emotions differentially 
affected WM capacity.  In addition, Pearson product-moment correlations were run to 
explore the relationship between EE and performance on the Stroop.   
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V.  Results 
A.  Demographics and Descriptive Information 
 Table 1 presents means and standard deviations for all affective and cognitive 
measures for the entire sample.   The range of scores on three of the BEQ indices 
(Negative Expressivity, Impulse Strength and Total Expressivity) was normally 
distributed, with mean values falling between 4.0 and 4.7 on a scale of 1 – 7.  However, 
scores on the Positive Expressivity subscale were slightly skewed to the high end (M = 
5.6, SD = .90).  This range of values is consistent with those obtained by Gross & John 
(1995), such that the scores were normally distributed for Total Expressivity, Negative 
Expressivity and Impulse Strength, but skewed upward for Positive Expressivity.  
Ethnicity was unrelated to Total Emotional Expressivity [F(2, 69) = .758. p = .47], 
Negative Expressivity [F(2, 69) = 1.12, p = .33], Positive Expressivity [F(2, 69) = 1.92, p 
= .15], and Impulse Strength [F(2, 69) = .19, p = .83]. 
 A score of greater than 24 on the USQ is indicative of high levels of objective 
stress (e.g., a higher than normal number of stressful events over the past week).  The 
overall mean USQ score of this sample was 24.12 (SD = 10.58).  Similarly, the mean 
score on the IES (M = 39.68, SD = 14.02) indicated moderate levels of subjective stress.  
Individual subscale scores on the IES Intrusion (M = 19.59, SD = 9.27) and Avoidance 
(M = 19.97, SD = 7.80) were comparable to those obtained by Horowitz and colleagues 
(1979) in their validation study of the measure. 
 Participants also scored within normal limits on most affective measures.  
Specifically, overall mean score on the BDI-II was 10.65 (SD = 7.0), indicating minimal 
depressive symptomatology in this sample.  Mean scores on the STAI – State subscale 
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(M = 36.77, SD = 9.26) and the STAI – Trait subscale (M = 41.1, SD = 8.60) were within 
the expected range of scores for an undergraduate sample.   
1.  Between sex comparisons 
 Men and women differed in the degree to which they were emotionally 
expressive.  Total scores on the BEQ were higher and less evenly distributed among 
women (M = 5.00, SD = .77) than men (M = 4.28, SD = .92).  As can be seen in Table 1, 
men also scored uniformly lower than women on three of the four expressivity indices, 
with significant group differences on the negative expressivity, impulse strength, and 
BEQ total scales.  There were no significant between sex differences on any other 
affective or cognitive variables. As such, gender was not used as a covariate in 
subsequent analyses. 
2.  Between group comparisons based on level of stress 
 Stress has been shown to differentially affect performance on cognitive tasks and 
on self-reported mood indices.  To evaluate the impact of objective stress on cognition 
and affect, participants were reassigned to one of two groups based on reported objective 
stress and group comparisons were performed for all variables.  Persons scoring greater 
than 24 (sample mean) on the USQ were categorized as “high” stress and those scoring at 
or below 24 on the USQ were categorized as “low/moderate” stress.  Bonferroni 
corrected t-tests were run to determine whether those reporting high levels of stress 
differed on any affective and/or cognitive variables from those reporting low to moderate 
levels of stress.  As can be seen in Table 1, several significant group differences emerged.  
Specifically, the high stress group indicated a greater number of intrusive thoughts (IES 
Intrusion; M = 23.39, SD = 7.20) than the low/moderate stress group (IES Intrusion; M = 
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16.00, SD = 9.65), p < .001.  In addition, scores on the BEQ Impulse Strength subscale 
were higher among the high stress group (M = 4.88, SD = 1.17) than among the 
low/moderate stress group (M = 4.12, SD = 1.16), p < .01.  State anxiety scores were also 
significantly higher among highly stressed individuals (M = 39.14, SD = 9.80) than 
among the low/moderately stressed individuals (M = 34.53, SD = 8.23) p < .05.   
3.  Intercorrelations among affective and cognitive variables 
 Because several of the variables of interest in this study are known to be 
correlated (i.e., depression and anxiety), Pearson product-moment correlations were run 
for all affective and cognitive variables.  As expected, all BEQ scales were significantly 
intercorrelated (rs = .52 - .86, ps <.001), indicating that each scale taps a unique 
component of a single construct – emotional expressivity.  Intrusive thinking was also 
positively and significantly correlated with self-reported objective stress (USQ; r = .41), 
depressive symptomatology (BDI-II; r = .28), current anxiety (STAI-State; r = .43) and 
trait anxiety (STAI-Trait; r = .44), all ps < .05.  In addition, higher levels of depressive 
symptoms (BDI-II) were associated with state and trait anxiety, rs = .50 and .68, 
respectively, ps < .001.  See Table 2, which presents intercorrelation values for all  
affective variables. 
 Scores on the OSPAN and DSPAN tasks were significantly and positively 
correlated with each other (r = .49, p < .001), indicating that these two tasks measure 
similar yet distinct functions.  However, while the Stroop CW was correlated with the 
DSPAN task (r = .24, p < .05), it was not associated with performance on the OSPAN 
task.  While these results are certainly not conclusive, they indicate that the DSPAN task 
likely taps into both the WM and executive function cognitive domains.   
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B.  Analysis of Primary Hypotheses 
1.  Hypothesis 1a.  Emotional expressivity (BEQ Total) will predict working memory 
performance (OSPAN, DSPAN) above and beyond anxiety (STAI-State) and depression 
(BDI-II).   
 
Scores on the BDI-II and STAI-State were significantly correlated with each 
other, but were not significantly related to performance on the OSPAN or DSPAN tasks.  
BEQ Total was also not correlated with OSPAN or DSPAN performance.  See Table 3, 
correlation matrix for variables included in regression analyses.  As such, the regression 
models containing STAI-State, BDI-II and BEQ Total as predictors of OSPAN and 
DSPAN performance were nonsignificant, Fs(3,70) = .58 and .24, respectively, ps > .05.   
 Intrusive thinking (IES-Intrusion) was positively correlated with OSPAN 
performance (r = .24, p <.05); however, controlling for intrusive thinking failed to bring 
the relationship between EE (BEQ Total) and WM (OSPAN) to significance, r = .06, p = 
.60.  Intrusive thinking was not significantly correlated with DSPAN performance, r = 
.03, p = .79.   
2.  Hypothesis 1b.  Persons high in emotional expressivity (BEQ Total) will perform 
better than those low in emotional expressivity on both working memory tasks (DSPAN, 
OSPAN). 
 
MANCOVA procedures failed to demonstrate a significant main effect for high 
EE  (n = 32) versus low EE (n = 42) groups on WM (OSPAN, DSPAN) performance, 
controlling for stress (USQ), F(2,70) = 1.31, p = .28.  Considering the possibility that the 
relationship between EE and WM may be a quadratic one where extremely high EE and 
extremely low EE persons may perform better or worse than those in the moderate range 
of EE, exploratory analyses were run to test this hypothesis.  Persons scoring beyond +1 
standard deviation from the mean on the BEQ Total were categorized as “extreme EE” (n 
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= 50); those within +1 standard deviation of the mean were considered “moderate EE” (n 
= 24).  ANCOVA analysis with extreme EE versus moderate EE as the independent 
variable, OSPAN as the dependent variable, and USQ as a covariate failed to demonstrate 
a significant main effect, F(1,73) = .903, p = .35.  Similar analyses were run using 
DSPAN as the dependent variable without covarying for stress level, as stress was 
unrelated to DSPAN performance.  Again, results were nonsignificant, F(1,73) = .211, p 
= .65. 
 Visual inspection of the relationship between EE and WM corroborated these 
results.  See Figure 4, 2 X 2 scatter plots of BEQ Total scores by OSPAN and DSPAN 
performance. 
3.  Hypothesis 2.  Intrusive thinking about stressful life events (IES-Intrusion) will 
mediate the relationship between emotional expressivity (BEQ Total) and working 
memory (OSPAN, DSPAN) such that the more intrusive thoughts a person has about 
stressful life events the poorer their performance will be on tasks of working memory.  
 
 Because the relationships between EE and WM performance were nonsignificant, 
the mediation analysis was unwarranted and therefore, not performed.  However, 
stepwise regression analyses confirmed that intrusive thinking mediates the relationship 
between stress and WM in accordance with Baron & Kenny’s (1986) criterion for 
mediation.  Objective stress (USQ) was significantly related to both WM (OSPAN) and 
intrusive thinking (IES-Intrusion), rs = .28 and .41 respectively, ps < .01.  Intrusive 
thinking (IES-Intrusion) was also significantly related to WM (OSPAN; r = .24, p < .05).  
The strength of the association between stress (USQ) and WM (OSPAN) was reduced to 
nonsignificance (r = .21, p > .05) after controlling for intrusive thinking (IES-Intrusion).  
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C.  Exploratory Analyses 
1.  Differential effects of positive and negative expressivity on working memory
Post-hoc analyses explored the relationships among positive and negative 
expressivity and performance on WM tasks.  Data were recoded based on a median split 
for both the Positive Expressivity subscale and the Negative Expressivity subscale of the 
BEQ.  MANOVA procedures with Positive and Negative Expressivity entered as 
independent variables and raw scores on the OSPAN and DSPAN as dependent variables 
were performed.  A significant main effect emerged for Negative Expressivity (F(1,73) = 
8.87, p < .01), with  persons scoring above the mean on the Negative Expressivity 
subscale (n = 42) performing significantly worse (M = 6.5, SD = 2.27) than persons 
scoring below the mean (n = 32) on the DSPAN (M = 8.0, SD = 2.90), but not the 
OSPAN.   There was no significant main effect for Positive Expressivity, F(2,69) = 2.72, 
p = .073; the interactive effect of Positive and Negative Expressivity on WM 
performance was also nonsignificant, F(2,69) = .306, p = .74.  
As described previously, women scored the higher range of expressivity on Total 
Emotional Expressivity, as well as the Negative Expressivity and Impulse Strength 
subscales of the BEQ.  This, together with the finding that persons high in Negative 
Expressivity performed worse on the DSPAN task than those low in Negative 
Expressivity, it was thought that there may be a sex-specific relationship between 
Negative Expressivity and working memory performance.  Specifically, it was thought 
that the relationship between Negative Expressivity and working memory may be 
stronger in women than in men.  However, bivariate Pearson product-moment 
correlations failed to demonstrate a significant sex-specific relationship between 
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Negative Expressivity and performance on either the DSPAN or the OSPAN tasks, all p’s 
> .05. 
2.  Relationships among Stroop and affective variables
 Performance on the Stroop Color Word test (Stroop CW) was significantly and 
positively correlated with objective stress (USQ; r = .28, p < .05) and intrusive thinking 
(IES-Intrusion; r = .24, p < .05).  As stated previously, the USQ and IES-Intrusion scales 
were also significantly related.  Given this, mediation analyses were performed to 
determine whether intrusive thinking mediates the relationship between stress and 
executive functioning as measured by the Stroop CW.  While the strength of the 
relationship between stress and Stroop performance was reduced after controlling for 
intrusive thinking, this change was nonsignificant.    
3.  Menstrual cycle related cognitive and affective functioning in women
 Menstrual cycle phase for women was determined by counting forward from 
reported first day of last menstrual period (“LMP”).  Cycle phases were defined as 
follows:  menstrual phase, days 1-7; follicular phase, days 8–22; and luteal phase, days 
23-31.  Women who did not report LMP or whose LMP was greater than 31 days prior to 
the date of study participation were excluded from these analyses.  Thus, a total of 39 (of 
42) women were included in these analyses.  Cycle phases were nearly equally 
represented with 14 women estimated to be in the menstrual phase, 13 women in the 
follicular phase and 12 women in the luteal phase. 
 Multiple Analysis of Variance with cycle phase (menstrual, follicular, luteal) as 
the independent variable and scores on all four Berkeley Expressivity Questionnaire 
scales (Total, Positive and Negative Expressivity and Impulse Strength) as the dependent 
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variables failed to show significant cycle-phase effects for Emotional Expressivity, all p’s 
> .05.  A second 3 (cycle phase) X 3 (OSPAN, DSPAN, Stroop CW) MANOVA failed to 
show a significant relationship between cycle phase and performance on cognitive tasks, 
all p’s > .05.  There were also no significant relationships between cycle phase and self-
reported anxiety (STAI), depression (BDI-II), objective stress (USQ) or intrusive 
thinking (IES – Intrusion). 
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VI.  Discussion 
A.  Summary of Results 
 Results of this study confirm that stress-related intrusive thinking mediates the 
relationship between stress and working memory.  It was also found that stress negatively 
impacts performance on higher level, executive function tasks, though the mediation 
model of intrusive thinking on the relationship between stress and executive functioning 
was not borne out.   Contrary to hypotheses, individual differences in overall emotional 
expressivity (BEQ Total) were not significantly related to WM capacity, nor were they 
associated with intrusive thoughts about stressful life events.  Interestingly, however, 
persons identified as highly expressive regarding negative emotions performed worse on 
the Digit Span Backwards task than those identified as less expressive about negative 
emotions.  Positive emotion expression was unrelated to performance on either WM task.   
Predictably, and as demonstrated in prior studies (e.g., Kring & Gordon, 1998), women 
as a group scored higher than men on two measures of EE – negative expressivity and 
impulse strength.  Expression of positive emotion was not significantly different between 
sexes.   
B.  Support for Klein’s (2002) Model 
 These findings support Klein’s (2002) model of stress, expressive writing and 
working memory.  Klein proposed that expressive writing attenuates the negative impact 
of stress on WM capacity via a reduction in stress-related intrusive thinking.  Results of 
this study, as in Klein’s studies, demonstrate that higher levels of self-reported event 
stress are associated with poorer working memory performance as measured by the 
OSPAN task, and that intrusive thinking about stressful events mediates the impact of 
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stress on WM performance.  This model remains undisputed by results of the present 
study; in fact, these results further validate the findings of Klein and colleagues related to 
the impact of stress on working memory. 
 The present research was designed not to challenge Klein’s model, but rather to 
evaluate the relationships among emotion expression, stress, intrusive thinking and 
working memory from a different vantage point.  The unique contribution of this study is 
that it evaluated whether individual differences in trait EE – the degree to which one 
typically expresses emotion – impacts WM performance, just as engaging in an 
expressive writing intervention does.  It was hypothesized that those who typically cope 
with stress by expressing their emotions may be less susceptible to intrusive thoughts 
about their emotions and, therefore, would have greater WM capacity than those who 
inhibit or suppress emotion impulses.  The present findings failed to support this 
hypothesis.  Overall emotional expressivity was unrelated to cognitive functioning.  
However, significant differences between high and low expressive persons emerged 
when evaluating the relationship between the subcomponents of expressivity (i.e., 
positive and negative expressivity) and cognitive function.  Persons considered highly 
expressive in response to negative emotions performed worse on one index (Digits 
Backwards of the WAIS-III) of WM than those who were low in negative emotion 
expression.   
C.  Unique Aspects of Negative Expressivity 
 This finding stands in contrast to previous findings suggesting that organization 
and/or cognitive restructuring of negative emotional events via expression of emotions 
frees up cognitive resources – a theory put forth by Foa & Kozak (1986) and elaborated 
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on by Klein (2002).  Based on this theory, one may expect that higher levels of 
expressivity about negative events would be associated with comparatively better 
working memory performance than lower levels of expressivity about negative events.  
Indeed, the beneficial effects of written emotional disclosure – a form of EE – 
surrounding traumas are quite clear.  However, the opposite was demonstrated in this 
study – persons highly expressive about negative emotions performed worse on one 
measure of working memory.  This would suggest that the benefits of emotion expressive 
interventions (such as expressive writing about past trauma) may be more salient for 
those persons who do not typically express their emotions about negative life events.  It is 
also possible that the beneficial effects of negative emotion expression are facilitated only 
when emoting occurs in a structured or organized way.  In other words, simply “venting” 
about negative life events may be largely unproductive, perhaps even destructive, while 
emoting through repeated writing exercises with clear limits and instructions (such as 
those outlined in Pennebaker’s expressive writing paradigm ) may be beneficial, leading 
to increased cognitive organization (Foa & Kozak, 1986), reduced intrusive thinking 
(Klein, 2002) and, potentially, improvements in cognitive functioning (Klein, 2001a).   
D.  Limitations and Future Research 
 There are some limitations of this research that are noteworthy and which should 
be addressed in future investigations.  First, and most importantly, these data are largely 
self-report and thus subject to response bias on the part of respondents.  Although the 
self-report measures used in this research were chosen based on their well-established 
validity and reliability, it is possible that some participants provided skewed self-
evaluations.  Future studies may want to focus on objective measurement of the major 
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constructs such as emotional expressivity and intrusive thinking via physiological or 
behavioral measures. 
 Another point to consider is the relationship between IQ and working memory. 
Working memory is substantially related to fluid measures of intelligence (Pennington, 
1994); in fact, the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale – 3rd Edition draws on performance 
on working memory tasks to compute Full Scale and Performance IQ scores.  It may be 
that individuals who are intrinsically better at working memory tasks, and considered to 
have greater cognitive reserve than those with lower IQ scores, may be less susceptible to 
the deleterious effects of stress on cognitive functioning.  The positive benefits of 
emotionally expressive coping may be more evident in those persons whose working 
memory functioning is poor to borderline at baseline.  This study did not control for 
individual differences in overall intelligence.  However, this may be something to 
evaluate not only in future studies of emotional expressivity and cognitive functioning, 
but also when investigating the relationship between cognitive functioning and stress. 
 Finally, it is important to consider the difference between objective and perceived 
stress and the differential impact each may have on psychological functioning and 
cognitive performance.   In this study, stress was measured using the Undergraduate 
Stress Questionnaire (Crandall, Preisler & Aussprung, 1992)  – a measure that 
characterizes an individual’s level of stress based on number of reported stressful events 
occurring within the past semester.  This method of measuring stress was chosen for two 
reasons.  First, this stimulus approach to stress measurement has been shown to predict 
both physical and mental health (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984).  In addition, prior research 
investigating relationships among stress and cognitive functioning demonstrates that 
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objective or stimulus-based stress is associated with measurable differences in cognitive 
functioning and mood (i.e., Klein & Barnes, 1994).  However, number of stressful events 
does not always translate into equivocal levels of perceived stress among individuals.  
Differences in situation appraisal, cognitive attributions and/or coping style may result in 
varying degrees of perceived stress (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984).  For example, losing 
twenty dollars – an event most would consider to be stressful -- may be perceived as a 
highly stressful event by one person and as only a minor inconvenience by another 
person.  Thus, assessment of individuals’ perceived level of stress may provide a more 
accurate estimate of distress.  
 In this study, we demonstrated that objective, or life event stress, was related to 
performance on at least one working memory task, but was unrelated to emotional 
expressivity or affective functioning.  It may be that expression of emotions is elicited not 
only in response to a stressful event, but rather is at least partially dependent upon 
perceived importance of that stressful event.  As such, it would be interesting to evaluate 
whether perceived stress is more predictive of mood and performance on cognitive tasks 
than simple life event stress.    
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Figure 1. Hierarchical structure of the domain of expressivity. 
Note. Figure taken from Gross, J.J., & John, O.P. (1998). Mapping the domain of 
expressivity: Multimethod evidence for a hierarchical model. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 74, 170-191. 
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Figure 2.  An illustration of Klein & Boals (2001b) study of stress, intrusive thinking and 
working memory. 
 
 
Figure 3.  Illustration of proposed relationships among emotional expressivity, intrusive 
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Table 1 
Group differences on all affective and cognitive variables
 
 Group Means (SD) 
 Total Sample Men Women Low/Mod Stress High Stress 
Variable (N = 74) (n = 32) (n = 42) (n = 38) (n = 36)
BEQ Total 4.69 (.90) 4.28 (.92)*** 5.00 (.76)*** 4.51 (.92) 4.88 (.86) 
BEQ Negative 3.96 (.97) 3.60 (.98)** 4.24 (.87)** 3.86 (1.05) 4.07 (.87) 
BEQ Positive 5.62 (1.01) 5.36 (1.14) 5.82 (.87) 5.54 (1.09) 5.71 (.94) 
BEQ Impulse Strength 4.49 (1.21) 3.89 (1.11)*** 4.94 (1.09)*** 4.12 (1.16)** 4.88 (1.17)** 
USQ Total 24.12 (10.58) 24.91 (10.28) 23.52 (10.89) 15.68 (5.21)*** 33.03 (6.78)*** 
IES Total  39.68 (14.02) 37.56 (14.01) 41.29 (13.98) 35.58 (14.75)** 44.00 (11.94)** 
IES Intrusion 19.59 (9.27) 17.69 (9.43) 21.05 (8.98) 16.00 (9.65)*** 23.39 (7.20)*** 
IES Avoidance 19.97 (7.80) 18.94 (7.96) 20.76 (7.69) 18.79 (7.62) 21.22 (7.90) 
BDI-II 10.65 (6.97) 11.00 (5.98) 10.38 (7.70) 9.82 (5.66) 11.53 (8.11)  
STAI (state) 36.77 (9.26) 36.09 (8.46) 37.29 (9.90) 34.53 (8.23)* 39.14 (9.80)* 
STAI (trait) 41.15 (8.60) 40.78 (8.11) 41.43 (9.03) 39.42 (8.13) 42.97 (8.81) 
Digit Span Backwards 7.84 (2.63) 7.53 (2.71) 8.07 (2.58) 7.34 (2.61) 8.36 (2.59) 
STROOP color-word 50.15 (11.95) 49.59 (10.36) 50.57 (13.14) 48.79 (9.82) 51.58 (13.85) 
OSPAN Total  49.41 (9.86) 48.88 (9.89) 9.94 (1.53) 47.71 (8.91) 51.19 (10.60) 
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
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Table 2 
Pearson intercorrelations among affective variables 
 
 Affective Variables
 
BEQ  
TOTAL 
BEQ 
NEG 
BEQ 
POS 
BEQ   
IS 
USQ 
TOTAL 
IES 
INTRU 
IES 
AVOID  BDI-II
STAI 
STATE 
STAI 
TRAIT 
BEQ TOTAL r 1          
BEQ NEGATIVE r .86** 1         
BEQ POSITIVE r .84** .64** 1        
BEQ IMPULSE 
STRENGTH r .85** .58** .52** 1       
USQ TOTAL r .17          .05 .07 .28* 1
IES INTRUSION r .30**          .23 .10 .41** .41** 1
IES AVOIDANCE r .04          -.07 -.05 .18 .19 .42** 1
BDI-II r -.04          -.03 -.21 .11 .19 .28* .15 1
STATE ANXIETY r .03          .06 -.20 .18 .28* .43** .13 .50** 1
TRAIT ANXIETY r .20          .17 -.07 .39** .32** .44** .15 .68** .47** 1
* p < .05, ** p < .01
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Table 3 
Pearson partial correlations of variables included in regression analyses 
 
 
Variable
 
OSPAN DSPAN STAI-State BDI-II BEQ Total IES Intrusion USQ Total 
OSPAN 1       
DSPAN        
        
        
        
        
.49*** 1
STAI-State .09 -.08 1
BDI-II .05 -.01 .50*** 1
BEQ Total .13 -.06 .03 -.04 1
IES  Intrusion .24* .03 .43*** .28* .30** 1  
USQ Total .28* .12 .28* .19 .17 .41** 1
* p < .05,  ** p < .01,  *** p < .001
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Figure 4.  2 X 2 scatter plots of BEQ Total scores by OSPAN and DSPAN performance. 
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